-2 -of times the U.S. current account is mentioned in the news per month, after rising sharply through the mid-2000s, declined considerably in frequency and has remained low in recent years. On the other hand, as indicated by the black line, we do see a slight uptick in references to U.S. "twin deficits" so far this year, though the frequency remains well below that of the mid-2000s. 3 In this note, we compare the present situation to that prevailing in the mid-2000s, when concerns about the NIIP and the current account were at the forefront, and we examine the prospects for U.S. external sustainability going forward. Our key finding is that there appears to be much less ground for being concerned about U.S. external sustainability going forward now than in the mid-2000s. 4 
Metric for External Sustainability
The metric for external sustainability we use is a standard one and requires that the NIIP/GDP ratio stabilizes. Intuitively, if this ratio were to keep getting more negative, debt service would eventually end up consuming all of GDP. In turn, the stability of NIIP/GDP has implications for the current account because the latter is essentially the flow associated with the NIIP stock. A positive current account (surplus) in a given year implies that a country has been a net lender to the rest of the world during 3 "Twin deficits" refers to the situation when an economy is running both a fiscal deficit and a current account deficit. Searches on the "U.S. trade deficit" reveal a similar pattern of newsworthiness qualitatively as for the current account, except that the frequency of mentions in the news rises significantly over the past year and a half. However, this increase appears to be mainly in relation to trade policy rather than sustainability concerns. News references are scaled by the total number of news stories originating from North America per month. 4 Concerns about "global imbalances", that is, the pattern of persistent current account deficits in some countries and persistent surpluses in others, have received a bit more attention in recent years, including through the introduction of the IMF's annual External Sector Report in 2012 (based on a methodology outlined in Phillips et al. (2013) ). Causes of global imbalances have also been the focus of academic research, for instance by Chinn and co-authors (Chinn et al. (2013); Chinn (2017) ). Discussions of global imbalances typically note that they have declined as a share of GDP since the global financial crisis. that year so that, abstracting from valuation changes, its NIIP increases, whereas the reverse is true for a negative current account (deficit). Therefore, again ignoring valuation changes, a stable NIIP/GDP implies that NIIP grows at the same rate as GDP.
Labelling the growth rate of GDP as g, we can write:
(1) Dividing both sides by GDP, and rewriting a bit: (2) Equation (2) implies that in the long run the NIIP/GDP is stable when:
Thus, if the NIIP/GDP is stable then CA/GDP has to be stable also, with the ratio of the latter to the former equal to the growth rate of nominal GDP. For 2017, the current account deficit was around 2½ percent of GDP and the NIIP/GDP ratio was about negative 32 percent, so that (CA/GDP)/(NIIP/GDP) expressed as a percentage was about 7¾ percent, well above the 4 percent increase actually recorded for U.S. nominal GDP growth.
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So at present, the necessary condition for stability is far from being satisfied.
Yet, as shown in Figure 2 , concerns about U.S. current account sustainability don't appear to be getting much attention.
The Situation Now versus the Early-to Mid-2000s
The early-to mid-2000s was a period when concerns about U.S. external sustainability were prominent. Going back to Figure 1 , we can see where these concerns were coming from-the current account deficit was rapidly expanding and the NIIP was deteriorating sharply. More detail about that period can be found in Bertaut, Kamin, and Thomas (2009) .
Given that the necessary condition for NIIP stability is still far from holding, why have concerns about U.S. current account sustainability faded? One reason is that the trade deficit (the black line in Figure 3 Second, even though the U.S. has much larger portfolio liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world than portfolio assets, most liabilities are fixed-income instruments, 6 One contributing factor to the higher income earned on U.S. direct investment abroad has been the tendency for U.S. multinationals to establish affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions and to book profits in those locations. As discussed in Guvenen et al. (2017) , this "profit shifting" practice has resulted in a larger U.S. trade deficit (because it reduces U.S. exports of intangibles such as intellectual property) but the flip side of this understatement of exports is higher recorded direct investment receipts. Importantly for our analysis, profit shifting does not affect the overall current account balance, which ultimately determines the expected evolution of the NIIP. whereas claims are tilted more toward equity. As such, with "low-for-long" interest rates and safe haven flows over the post-GFC period, U.S. net portfolio payments abroad since 2008 have actually decreased, even as the portfolio position has become more negative.
Looking Ahead
But what matters is where we are headed and whether the necessary condition for stability is going to be satisfied over the long run. To assess this, we need a model and some baseline assumptions to put into the model to obtain the relevant projections.
As in Bertaut, Kamin, and Thomas (2009) Note that the current account pins down aggregate financing flows but equations are specified that determine how these aggregate flows are allocated between direct investment and portfolio flows. one notable exception: For China, we extend the downward trend of the past ten years. deficits were projected to continue to increase as a share of GDP. At that time, interest rate and GDP growth projections for both the United States and our foreign trading partners were much higher. We also re-estimate the model periodically, and some of the estimated elasticities have also changed.
As shown in Figure 9 , NII declines as interest rates rise (reversing the trend when interest rates were falling), but eventually stabilizes at about 0.5 percent of GDP. The NIIP as a share of GDP (Figure 10 ) continues to become more negative, but its 8
The continued downward trend in Chinese GDP growth reflects the general belief that potential growth there will continue to slow. We exclude Venezuela from our foreign aggregate because of the difficulty projecting a longer term forecast given the depths of its recession and current hyperinflation. Because longer run Blue Chip forecasts have not been updated since last October, we make a judgmental adjustment to short-term interest rates in 2020 and 2021, based on the upward revision to the median projection of the Federal Funds rate by FOMC participants between the September and December projections.
deterioration slows as the current account deficit narrows, and it too eventually stabilizes, at a little over negative 40 percent of GDP. This suggests external sustainability in the long run, unlike what we were projecting in 2008.
Of course, assumptions matter. What if interest rates were to rise more sharply over the next few years than we have assumed in our forecast -by another 100 basis points by 2020, for example? In this case, NII would deteriorate more significantly but would stabilize at a level close to zero once interest rates peak. The current account balance would still narrow, though the improvement would be delayed a couple more years, and the NIIP would stabilize at a slightly more negative level. Assumptions on exchange rates also matter. For example, if the dollar were to resume appreciating, there would be more persistent pressures on the trade and current account deficits, NII would eventually become negative, and the NIIP would continue to deteriorate. On the other hand, if the dollar were to continue depreciating, the external deficits would narrow much faster and the NIIP as a share of GDP would stabilize more quickly as well.
Challenges of Our Approach
One challenge stems from the fact that we have focused on the necessary condition only of the stability of the NIIP/GDP ratio. Given that in our baseline assumption, the NIIP stabilizes at a bit more than negative 40 percent of GDP, a relevant question is whether a ratio of that magnitude can be maintained. The key is the willingness of foreigners to acquire more U.S. assets to finance a bigger NIIP position than now exists or whether U.S. assets would become too large a proportion of foreign portfolios well before that point is reached. Gagnon (2017a) , for example, has recently argued that no country has been able to maintain as large a NIIP as negative 50-60 percent of GDP without major adjustments, and so he views such a large ratio as being unsustainable for the United States. Another challenge comes from the partial equilibrium nature of the model we use, which has some shortcomings. Is the U.S. current account path being projected here consistent with the paths of current accounts in the rest of the world? Our approach does not impose this consistency. For example, in the past a large part of global imbalances has been traced to excessive external deficits in the United States and excessive surpluses in China, so for overall sustainability to be maintained adjustments in both would be required. Although we do not impose that constraint, we nonetheless have seen global adjustments in that direction: China's surplus has been sharply reduced, and the surplus of the oil exporting countries has been eliminated. Also, in a general equilibrium 10 In a companion post, Gagnon (2017b) , he discusses possible policies to solve the problem, with his major recommendation being to encourage an orderly decline in the dollar. Note that our estimate of the NIIP stabilizing at a little over negative 40 percent of GDP is plausibly in the neighborhood of negative 50 percent of GDP if direct investment is measured by the market value. approach, if the U.S. path of the current account, say, were found to be unsustainable, one of the mechanisms would be an adjustment of the dollar, but our partial equilibrium approach does not tell us how much the dollar would need to adjust.
But there are also tradeoffs as you go to a more general equilibrium approach.
There are lots of details in our partial equilibrium approach that allow us to look at the composition of assets and liabilities. At a minimum, our partial equilibrium approach helps us understand and quantify the many transmission mechanisms from which more informed judgments can be made. 
